So I owe you an analysis of Socrates's refutations of Cephalus and Polemarchus in Book I. Now if I were the type to put noble things to paltry use, as someone with no sensibility might use a heartfelt letter as scratch paper, I might say that justice, not being identical with paying one's debts, does not require me to do so — and that I could prove it. Because I, Sam-I-am that I am, being clever as clever as clever can be and having read Plato's Republic know Socrates's argument against Cephalus's definition of justice by heart.
And I could very well stoop to that, because I do think very much of how clever I am. But above all I want to show you that Socrates would not do so, that his form of refutation is completely different from this kind of artful dodge that "takes refuge in words." A Platonic dialectician is not a debater. He does not refute to hide from the obvious, nor to display his wit, nor even simply to prove a point (as one does for whom refutation just means proving the contradictory of the position to be refuted). He refutes as one who, knowing that he does not know, pursues wisdom.
But what do these high-sounding words actually mean? How do we see this knowledge and this pursuit in the refutations of Cephalus and Polemarchus — particularly as they may seem to us to be far from artless, and that they may seem to disclose Socrates as a teacher rather than a learner? This question sets the task of an analysis of these refutations, and with it, this analysis begins. In other words, the first step in understanding Socratic refutation is the refutation of the way in which Socratic refutation appears.
continued
It is my hope that, as you continue to draw the water of your answer from the stone of Book I, you will also indicate on which side of the fence you think Bloom's claim about these preliminary "refutations" has its home. Is it a satisfactory interpretation of these initial arguments of Book I to say that they can and should be understood as an act of --and here I paraphrase --city building. That is to say, is there a "city in speech" being built through speech --a process in which members are ordered to eventually assume a hierarchy of discourse which ascends, like the Platonic line (one does not, presumably, continue to opine in epistemic activity), by way of dismissal, or, like the Noble lie or the treatment of certain poetry, by way of 'censorship'. Can we accept the claim that Socratic dialectic --if that is indeed what we are even provided an example of in this part of the text (or to wax Aristotelian for a second, perhaps dialectic is a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον)--is a narrow gate that only lets certain souls through its passage and even then only to some extent or other? The function such dialectic would be to lead souls to truth, but not merely qua individual souls, but rather through their properly ordered communion. Cephalos and Polemarchos may each be denied in some (differing) measure even entry though this gate, they may be barred from ascent, but this is their proper place within an over-arching edifice. So, if my paraphrase is at all faithful to Bloom's interpretation, I wonder if you will consider this interpretation compatible with your own.....
ReplyDeleteSo I guess what I want to know is, why do you care in the first place whether it its possible for us to be accepted by Bloom's claim? What is the concern which would initially draw someone to seek such an inclusion?
DeleteThank you for this question (which I seem to have seen you asking already as you restrained yourself from pounding the air with your fist while Tim Wilson addressed a very similar question to my own little thesis so many years ago).
ReplyDeleteBut the answer will have to take into account first of all what it would mean for us to "accept" this claim, on the hypothesis that it is correct. It seems to me one would have to paraphrase your question as asking whether this claim can accept us——but we might also add, whether it in any way concerns us to be accepted by it.
"why do you care in the first place whether it its possible for us to be accepted by Bloom's claim? What is the concern which would initially draw someone to seek such an inclusion?"
ReplyDeleteHahaha! Oh come now, Amos! I have little interest in Bloom's personal charm or political allegiances or personal graces or...and let's exclude the less irrelevant academic prestige or his alliance with some of the most influential readers of Plato in the second half of the last century (Strauss's school must be given this) or even especially his most masterful English rendering of the text under discussion. His interpretive essay --for nothing other than the thoughts it conveys regarding Plato's words, is alone intrinsically worthy of consideration, no? I mean, why read Voeglin, as Sam does? So my point is, the "concern which would initially draw someone to seek such an inclusion is (or can/should be) always the same, namely to understand Plato's thought --and of course, yes, to understand the truth in that thought.
These all seem like good reasons for studying Bloom and weighing his proposed interpretations. But if weighing a philosophical proposal means applying for admission into a hierarchical society, one has to ask what good it would be to be admitted, no?
DeleteBut maybe Bloom (as well as Straussians in general) does not mean to assign the quality of Platonic dialectic to his own thinking. In that case, I wonder what tradition Bloom thinks he is part of, since he has denied himself admission to the Platonic. That is to say, it seems puzzling that anyone would study Plato (except as an interesting and influential historical phenomenon), not hoping to learn from him.
I take it, at any rate, that Bloom thinks himself very much "in the club."
Whether Bloom thinks of himself as "in the club" or still applying for the decoder ring is a question best left alone my opinion. The interesting and even essential question seems to me to be the one you raise first, namely whether in principle he MUST be a part of "the club":
ReplyDelete"But if weighing a philosophical proposal means applying for admission into a hierarchical society, one has to ask what good it would be to be admitted, no?"
Here's what I think. Anytime there is a change in language of significant measure, there is a change in which the the world can appear, and that always means a change in those who are able to let it appear AND able to let it fail to appear (notice this is not an either/ or--sorry, nota bene). Anytime philosophy is undertaken is one of those times. Because language founds the communion of a community, when its philosophic capacity eventually emerges, so too does the capacity for a wholly different community. One major difference is that the communication of this community is marked by a tenuousness, a fragilty, an errancy. As a consequence the community, because of the rare thing (indeed even the holy thing, a hier-arche) that precedes it, sets a precedent of hierarchy. Rare is the man that understands Aristotle's Metaphysics. Even rarer are the times when he can make his home in that understanding. But the most self-evident of all places in the metaphysics, or rather, the exposition of what is most self-evident, namely Gamma. IV, ---even this place and especially this place, which is not simply a philosophical proposal, but founds the very "proposition" itself, this place is an entry into something not self-evident, a new self understanding of discourse knowingly grounded on principles and principled in this grounding. A new relation to and from language emerges. Here is what I am saying, if Aristotle, just by trying to say what we all still already know in his principle of non-contradiction, had to engage in a strange and by no means self evident task --one that had not occurred to anyone before him and that depended on the highest wisdom, namely the propositional founding of language, then what kind of difficult rite of passage must Plato exact of his followers when he tries to ananmnetically recover mysterious things entirely forgotten. Indeed even the Geometry with which this passage began was not unmysterious to Plato. But why should one ask "what good it is to be admitted"? Many in fact did ask that. But a few realized that they didn't yet know what "good" meant.
A lot depends on how we understand the knowledge of ignorance of the good to which you allude in your last remark. Your initial paraphrase of Bloom (which I am in no position to criticize), makes it appear as though Socrates had possession of an occult secret into which only a few could be initiated, as though his knowledge of his own ignorance were really just knowledge, of a special sort which is not accessible to everyone. But at least in your present remarks you seem to be saying something different. I'm not sure!
DeleteBut really, couldn't we say about any philosopher whatsoever that his thinking is somehow a "narrow gate?" At the very least it requires a fairly developed sense of the language in which the philosopher operates. And one has to be astute and have some endurance and a good memory and so on. But I guess that Bloom means something more than that, and you as well.