Essaying the Good

Who were the philosophers Plato and Aristotle? If you demand an answer as terse as the question, it has to be something like "Proponents of forms and of moderate realism,  respectively." Plato believed that universals (such as "the Good") were simple, substantial entities (ideas or forms) from which particular things and actions (such as a good city or a good deed) received their identity by participation. Aristotle believed more or less the opposite, that particulars were primary and universals existed only by being the substantial form of particulars.

The ethical theories of the two philosophers would seem to derive from their respective ontologies as follows. If the ability to discern good things from bad depends on some relation to a substantial "Idea of the Good," then it is of paramount importance for one's life to establish the relation to it which will allow one to use it as a measure or reference for the good and bad in things. But since this Idea is simple, having it available as a measure seems to be a matter not of knowing some essential fact or facts about it (i.e. having a definition), but rather of simply having it in view in some sense which is very difficult to define, but which is more like a transformation of the soul than the acquisition of a piece of information. Or, if the good in primary substances is dependent on them for its existence, and indeed is only in a secondary sense, then one has to have a keen eye for the ways in which things are, and this perceptiveness develops only through a life of virtue, which is to say, a life devoted to such action and restraint as eradicates confusion and promotes clarity whenever an occasion arises to do so.

Despite the coherence with which these two philosophers seem to have produced models for living based on theories about particulars and universals, the emphasis on this ontological point of tension between the teacher and the student distracts from the real worth of the ethical thinking of both. It turns the true story on its head by implying that each of them believed he had reached a fundamental understanding of being which had then to be applied to a certain set of beings, namely, those which are good, in their relation to the universal "good." On the contrary, the writings of Plato and Aristotle are saturated with a sense of humility before the good, and from the beginning of every inquiry, an attentiveness to its intimations.

Then would not an awareness of [the good] have great weight in one's life, so that, like archers who have a target, we would be more apt to hit on what is needed? But if this is so, one ought to try to get a grasp, at least in outline, of what it is and to what kind of knowledge or capacity it belongs.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.2  (emphasis mine)

"But, you blessed men, let's leave aside for the time being what the good itself is—for it looks to me as though it's out of the range of our present thrust to attain the opinions I now hold about it. But I'm willing to tell what looks like a child of the good and most similar to it, if you please, or if not, to let it go."

"Do tell," he said. "Another time you'll pay us what's due on the father's narrative."

"I could wish," I said, "that I were able to pay and you were able to receive it itself, and not just the interest, as is the case now. Anyhow, receive this interest and child of the good itself. But be careful that I don't in some way unwillingly deceive you in rendering the account of the interest fraudulent."

Plato,  Republic, VI 506e-507a (emphasis mine)

Terms like idea or phronesis should not be regarded as elements of formal ontological or anthropological systems, applied as an afterthought to ethics. Rather, they are in themselves essays upon the good. Thinking the Good as an eminently substantial entity, thinking it as a teleological perfection—these are ways toward the Good itself, thrusts in its direction, not unshakable propositions on which to found judgments about it.

Should we avoid using these terms that fall short of an absolute cognition of the good itself as it is in itself? Yes, we should, if and when we see an occasion for another, deeper thrust, for which we should be ever watchful. But in the meantime our inheritance of these advances on the good must be well-invested. 

A Thesis Concerning Liberal Education

The task of educating free men is one of bringing them into an unimpeded relation to the good, insofar as such a relation has already been made possible by the ideas of the good in the light of which the various human sciences have found freedom. This task has two purposes: 1) primarily, to ground as deeply and rationally as possible a respect for the mysterious being and self-relation of the good, and 2) secondarily, to remove as far as possible the obstacles to the perfect operation of prudence in all dimensions of human relatedness to the good.

photo by jitze

The secondary purpose is accomplished by directing students through a carefully sequenced, pedagogically principled, distinct course of study in each discipline, not to the point of mastery, however, but only in the measure in which thorough comprehension of the special character of the discipline requires acquisition of a considerable amount of its particular content. This includes the discipline of philosophy, whose function is to reflect on the natures of the dimensions of human relatedness to the good in as comprehensive a light as possible, and to determine their interrelations in that light.

The primary purpose of liberal education presupposes the accomplishment, at least to some degree, of the secondary purpose. The conventional Socratic seminar seems to have this function of creating a space for the mysterious undisclosedness of the good to show itself. It demands a careful letting-things-be, which at times brings those bold enough to venture it and patient enough to endure it into an acute sensitivity to the good not yet revealed in things. The traditional concept of a disciplinary major also contributes to this sensitivity, by bringing the student closer to the crisis or crises at the boundaries of his own elected discipline. Because the approach to this purpose involves discovering limitations, ambiguities, and cross-purposes in the synoptic framework determined by philosophy, it requires that this framework be already articulated as clearly and completely as possible. Unlike the secondary purpose, the primary purpose cannot be executed according to any preconceived plan. Its success cannot be measured. Indeed, it can easily be faked by combining a cynical attitude towards human endeavor with a habitual lip service to pious truisms. It requires patient courage, sober hope, and a good will. We call it "thinking."

Two notable consequences follow from the above thesis:

1. For the purposes of liberal education, a curriculum cannot be defined by a selection of texts or even by a selection of disciplines, but by a certain way of dealing with all disciplines. This result imposes a challenging requirement on liberal education that it incorporate not only the traditionally liberal studies, but all dimensions of human relatedness to the good, ranging from agriculture to music. On the other hand, it eliminates the need for much vagueness and embarrassed silence on the question of what qualifies a field of study to be included in a complete liberal education.
2. The two purposes of liberal education articulate the means for the accomplishment of its task into two distinct activities, which must always be held apart. The attempt to construct interdisciplinary confrontations when the disciplines themselves are not yet clear can only issue in confusion or cynicism regarding philosophical reasoning. This prematurely poetic form of education amounts to a beautiful invitation to the skeptical ersatz thoughtfulness which enables many a liberal arts major to pass for educated.