The ethical theories of the two philosophers would seem to derive from their respective ontologies as follows. If the ability to discern good things from bad depends on some relation to a substantial "Idea of the Good," then it is of paramount importance for one's life to establish the relation to it which will allow one to use it as a measure or reference for the good and bad in things. But since this Idea is simple, having it available as a measure seems to be a matter not of knowing some essential fact or facts about it (i.e. having a definition), but rather of simply having it in view in some sense which is very difficult to define, but which is more like a transformation of the soul than the acquisition of a piece of information. Or, if the good in primary substances is dependent on them for its existence, and indeed is only in a secondary sense, then one has to have a keen eye for the ways in which things are, and this perceptiveness develops only through a life of virtue, which is to say, a life devoted to such action and restraint as eradicates confusion and promotes clarity whenever an occasion arises to do so.
Despite the coherence with which these two philosophers seem to have produced models for living based on theories about particulars and universals, the emphasis on this ontological point of tension between the teacher and the student distracts from the real worth of the ethical thinking of both. It turns the true story on its head by implying that each of them believed he had reached a fundamental understanding of being which had then to be applied to a certain set of beings, namely, those which are good, in their relation to the universal "good." On the contrary, the writings of Plato and Aristotle are saturated with a sense of humility before the good, and from the beginning of every inquiry, an attentiveness to its intimations.
Then would not an awareness of [the good] have great weight in one's life, so that, like archers who have a target, we would be more apt to hit on what is needed? But if this is so, one ought to try to get a grasp, at least in outline, of what it is and to what kind of knowledge or capacity it belongs.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.2 (emphasis mine)
"But, you blessed men, let's leave aside for the time being what the good itself is—for it looks to me as though it's out of the range of our present thrust to attain the opinions I now hold about it. But I'm willing to tell what looks like a child of the good and most similar to it, if you please, or if not, to let it go."
"Do tell," he said. "Another time you'll pay us what's due on the father's narrative."
"I could wish," I said, "that I were able to pay and you were able to receive it itself, and not just the interest, as is the case now. Anyhow, receive this interest and child of the good itself. But be careful that I don't in some way unwillingly deceive you in rendering the account of the interest fraudulent."
Plato, Republic, VI 506e-507a (emphasis mine)
Terms like idea or phronesis should not be regarded as elements of formal ontological or anthropological systems, applied as an afterthought to ethics. Rather, they are in themselves essays upon the good. Thinking the Good as an eminently substantial entity, thinking it as a teleological perfection—these are ways toward the Good itself, thrusts in its direction, not unshakable propositions on which to found judgments about it.
Should we avoid using these terms that fall short of an absolute cognition of the good itself as it is in itself? Yes, we should, if and when we see an occasion for another, deeper thrust, for which we should be ever watchful. But in the meantime our inheritance of these advances on the good must be well-invested.
Sorry to not get immediately into the meat and potatoes of this important discussion –which I will try shortly to do, but first I am in need of a (maybe tangential) clarification. Since I take these discussions as well as the masthead of your blog both seriously and leisurely, allow me this digression…
ReplyDelete“Aristotle believed more or less the opposite, that particulars were primary and universals existed only by being the substantial form of particulars.”
–I may be mistaken (I look forward to you directing me to the relevant argument for correction), but I do not think Aristotle thought universals were per se substantial forms. Here’s why: take a tree. The logical apprehension of the species of this being can be called a universal, say, treeness ---which is a simple apprehension of the tree made possible by the essence inherent to it. However, this tree ALSO has a substantial form which makes the tree the substance that it is, namely, the nutritive soul of such a tree. Likewise in the good ol’ Aristotelian analogy of the statue, the form which makes the artificial substance of the statue is the shape imparted to the marble, but the simple apprehension of what a statue is includes both the shape and the marble (form AND matter). From these types of considerations the medievals carried out, in unpretentious fashion, Aristotle’s thought into such subtleties as the fascinating concept of “common matter.” I know you have been studying Aristotle as you teach him, so I'm interested to know whether you might have a reading alternative to this tradition on this matter.
Anyway, more relevant comments from me to come (I hope)!
I am not aware of any consensus regarding Aristotle's account of how substance and universality are related. To be honest, I am not deeply acquainted with the Metaphysics, and I rely on secondary sources at this point. The first two paragraphs of my post were not intended to present an authoritative interpretation, but just one of several plausible readings among those presently contending to be the last word (S. Marc Cohen's SEP article is my source on this). My overall point is that the pursuit of such a standard account may be misguided. It may be that despite Aristotle's reputation for reducing thinking to propositional content in syllogistic frameworks, he was still cognizant of some need for flexibility in trying the ways toward saying the Good—which flexibility leads to the present confusion over whether substantial forms are universals or particulars or some other third thing. Again, I freely admit I'm shooting my mouth off here, having made no deep study of the Metaphysics. My reason for talking out of turn like this is just that I believe establishing the right context for studying the Metaphysics to be more urgent for an incurable beginner such as myself than actually reading the thing, yet.
ReplyDeleteBecause, to be brief, my wit is soulless, I am sure that my comments will struggle to be succinct; I apologize in advance for that (maybe, later, I will try to turn some of them into a more readable cross post at Seynsgeschichte).
ReplyDeleteI read your post as putting its finger on something quite profound regarding a problem intrinsic to the essence of philosophy. I am grateful that you are formulating it in the above manner; your posts give me an opportunity to consider it afresh and under the new light you shed upon it. My true appreciation of this, and of what I think are the incalculable dimensions of this problem, should hopefully come to light as we discuss it.
That being said, I would like to make, at least to start things off, a structural criticism of your post --something like an examination of the strategy of its argument. Permit me to sketch the following outline: After rehearsing for your reader what you take to be the standard "fortune cookie" account of Plato and Aristotle's "systems" (a misnomer, you rightly emphasize), you proceed to argue in a way that can be divided into two sections. The first is an alleged genealogy of ethics from ontology, the second is something like a Levanasian reassertion of ethics over ontology which tries to counter that genealogy by recognizing what it asserts to be the "real worth" enjoyed by the "ethical thinking" of both.